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1 Introduction
A large body of empirical literature has suggested that oil price shocks have an important
e¤ect on economic activity. This literature has convincingly argued that oil prices were
both signicant determinants of U.S. economic activity and exogenous to it in the post-war
period.1 However, despite 30 years of research since the rst major post-war oil crisis in
1973-74, how exactly can oil shocks cause a severe economic recession still remains an open
question. Imported oil as an input for the entire U.S. economy accounted for roughly one
to two percent of the total production cost in the early 1970s. Based on this cost share,
and assuming constant returns to scale, even a 100% increase in the price of oil can only
translate into an approximately one to two percent decrease in output, notwithstanding the
likely counter e¤ects from factor substitutions. Yet the actual decline in output following
the 1973 oil crisis, which caused a roughly 80 percent increase in the price of imported oil,
was about seven to eight percent from its peak. A strong multiplier is clearly missing in
standard models.
Standard economic theory not only substantially under-predicts the contraction of output
following the oil shocks in 1973-74, but also fails to explain the revival of the U.S. economy
starting in the middle of 1975 despite the continuing rise in the oil price level in that period.
Standard theory predicts an immediate, permanent drop in output after a permanent increase
in oil prices, while empirical studies show that output undergoes a U-shaped transitional path
after a permanent oil shock.2 For example, real GDP dropped by only 2 percent on impact
in 1974, and the contraction continued for nearly 5 more quarters until 1975. Also, despite
oil prices remaining high and continuing to rise throughout the late 1970s, the U.S. economy
started to recover in the middle of 1975, and by the end of 1977 real GDP was already back
to its potential trend level. Such a dramatic recovery after a nearly permanent oil price
increase is not predicted by standard general equilibrium models.
Figure 1 illustrates these multiplier-accelerator e¤ects after the oil price increases in
late 1973. In the top panel, the solid line represents the log price of imported oil, and
the dashed lines represent percentage changes of the oil price. In the middle panel, the
solid line represents uctuations in GDP relative to its trend (dened by the HP lter). In
the 4th quarter of 1973 and the rst quarter of 1974, when the oil price increased sharply
(nearly doubled), real GDP dropped by only two percent, consistent with the prediction of
a standard economic model. However, the contraction continued during the entire year of
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1974. A trough was not reached until 5 quarters later in early 1975, and by then real GDP
had declined more than seven percent from its pre-shock level. Also notice the revival in
1975. Within 3 years, the U.S. economy was almost back to its pre-shock level again by the
4th quarter of 1978, despite oil prices remaining high and continuing to rise throughout that
period.
Another striking aspect of the 1974-75 recession is that xed investment su¤ered the
severest hit both absolutely and relative to output. Based on HP-ltered data (the bottom
panel in Figure 1), the fall in investment during an average recession prior to the 1973 oil
shock was about 20% from peak to trough. During 1974-75, however, investment fell by more
than 35% from its peak. Furthermore, the standard deviation of investment was about 4:4
times that of output prior to the 1973 oil shock. This volatility ratio increased to 7:1 during
the 1973 oil shock period. In contrast, the ratio of the standard deviation of non-durable
goods consumption to GDP was about 0:54 prior to the 1973 oil shock, and became 0:31
during the oil shock period.
Thus, there are several major puzzles associated with the 1975 recession following the oil
shock in 1973-74:
1). Why was the recession so deep much deeper than predicted by standard models?
2). Why was the trough of the recession delayed for 4-6 quarters?
3). Why was there a strong recovery in economic activity in 1976-78 despite oil prices
remaining high and continuing to rise during the entire period?
4). Why did investment su¤er the severest hit during that period compared to other
components of GDP?
The rst puzzle has already drawn a substantial amount of attention. But the last three
puzzles have rarely been emphasized in the theoretical literature. Hamilton and Herrera
(2004) stress that explaining the delay of the e¤ects of oil price shocks is an important
challenge for theory: (...) the greatest e¤ects of an oil shock do not appear until three
or four quarters after the shock. Investigating the cause of this delay would seem to be an
important topic for research(Hamilton and Herrera 2004, p.281).
Oil shocks have been assigned a prominent role in contemporary macroeconomic text-
books and models as examples of supply-side disturbances. This includes the modern version
of the IS-LM model (see, e.g., Abel and Bernanke 2001) and the neoclassical business-cycle
models (see, e.g., Hamilton 1988a). Yet, when actual oil prices are used for simulations, stan-
dard economic models cannot explain the deep recession in 1974-75 and the strong recovery
in 1976-78 by the oil increase in 1973-74. Kim and Loungani (1992), for example, argue that
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standard models can account for at most 1635 percent of the reduction in output during
the oil crises in 1973-74. The key for the failure is the lack of a strong multiplier-accelerator
mechanism in standard models to amplify and propagate the impact of oil shocks throughout
the economy.
For this reason, Barsky and Kilian (2001) argue that the recession in 1974-75 and the
subsequent recovery in 1976-78 may have nothing to do with the oil shocks in 1973-74.
Instead, they argue that the expansionary monetary policies conducted in the early 1971-72
were responsible for the recession in 1974-75 and the ination in 1975-76. Their argument
is based on a multiplier-accelerator monetary transmission mechanism. This mechanism
generates an economic boom after the expansionary monetary policy in the early 1970s, and
it was this boom that planted the seed for its own destruction in the mid-1970s. While
intriguing, this argument remains a speculation unless quantitative simulations using actual
money supply data can be conducted based on their theoretical model so as to show that
the simulated time series replicate the U.S. data.3
To search for the missing multiplier on the real side of the economy, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996) argue that monopolistic competition is responsible for amplifying the im-
pact of the oil shock. Finn (2000), however, disputes this theory by arguing that perfect
competition can also account for the depth of the recession if rmscapacity utilization rate
is allowed to vary in response to the oil shock. Neither of these models, however, is able to
explain the accelerator e¤ect of the oil shock: the greatest e¤ects of the oil shock do not
appear until several quarters after the shock, and a strong recovery is observed within a
couple of years despite oil prices remaining high. If actual oil prices are used in simulations,
then following the sharp increase in oil prices in 1973-74, both Finns and Rotemberg and
Woodfords models predict an immediate recession that will last throughout the entire 1970s
without recovery. Such a prediction contradicts what we see in Figure 1.
This paper proposes a model to explain the multiplier-accelerator e¤ect of oil shocks on
the U.S. economy in the 1970s. Our explanation builds on the insights of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1996) and Finn (2000), and is closely related to the suggestion of Hamilton (1988a,
1988b and 2003). According to Hamilton, the oil crisis in 1973-1974 a¤ected the aggregate
economy mainly by depressing aggregate demand, such as consumption and investment. In
this paper we focus on investment demand. One possible way to model such a demand-side
e¤ect on investment is to allow for externalities among rms. Due to externalities among
rms, the strength of aggregate demand facing an intermediate goods producer is a function
of the production level of other rms. Thus, when the oil crisis hit the U.S. economy,
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contractions in economic activity at each rm reinforced each other via the externalities,
giving rise to a strong multiplier e¤ect. The same force of interdependence and reinforcement
among rmsproduction decisions also caused the economy to over-shoot when converging
to the steady state, resulting in cyclical uctuations. Such a cyclical propagation mechanism
is responsible for the temporary revival of the U.S. economy in 1976-78. Thus we show that
the recession in 1974-75 and the recovery in 1976-78 can be fully rationalized by the oil price
increase in 1973-74 alone, without the need to resort to other unobserved shocks in that
period. This prediction is also consistent with our VAR analysis of the impact of oil shocks
on the U.S. economy in that period.
Despite the improvement of our model over the existing models in explaining the business
cycle in the 1970s, there are obvious limitations to our model as well. Like existing general
equilibrium models (such as those of Finn 2000 and Rotemberg and Woodford 1996), our
model implies symmetric e¤ects of oil shocks. In the data, however, the e¤ects of oil shocks
appear to be highly asymmetric in that increases in oil prices tend to impact the U.S.
economy far more signicantly than decreases in oil prices (see, e.g., Hamilton 2003 and Mork
1989). Starting around the mid-80s, decreases in oil prices were as frequent as increases. A
structural change in the relation between oil and the rest of the economy in the 1980s has
been extensively documented by many authors (see, e.g., Mork 1989, Hamilton 1996 and
2003, Hooker 1996 and 2002). For this reason, we stop our analysis at the period before the
mid-80s because our model is not suitable for analyzing the e¤ects of the negative oil shocks
after the mid-80s. However, we do extend our analysis to cover the second major oil crisis
in 1979-80.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its
empirical predictions. Section 3 provides circumstantial empirical evidence to support the
predictions of our model. Section 4 extends the analysis to the second oil shock period
between 1979 and 1984. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The model we study is a slightly modied version of the model of Wen (1998). There are two
types of goods in the economy, nal goods and intermediate goods. The nal good sector
is competitive and uses intermediate goods to produce output according to the technology,
Y =
R 1
i=0
yi di
1=
; where  2 (0; 1) measures the degree of factor substitutability among
the intermediate goods (the exact elasticity of substitution is 1=(1 )). Let pi be the relative
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price of intermediate good i in terms of the nal good. Prots of a nal good producer are
given by  = Y   R 1
i=0
piyidi: The price of the nal good is normalized to one. Prot
maximization leads to the inverse demand function for intermediate goods, pi = Y 1 y 1i :
Assume that each intermediate-good-producing rm i is a monopolist specializing in
producing good i. The technology for producing intermediate goods is given by yi =
(eiki)
aknani o
ao
i ; where e 2 [0; 1] denotes the capacity utilization rate, k denotes capital stock, n
denotes labor, and o denotes oil. We assume that oil cannot be domestically produced and the
elasticities satisfy fao; ak; ang 2 [0; 1] and (ak + an + ao)  1, indicating possible increasing
returns to scale at the rm level. Assuming that rms are price takers in the factor markets,
the prots of rm i are then given by i = piyi (r+i)ki wni pooi; where (r + i) denotes
the users cost of capital, w denotes real wage, and po denotes the real price of imported oil.
Notice that factor prices are common to all rms. Each rms capital depreciation rate is
assumed to depend on its capacity utilization rate, i = (1=) ei ; where  > 1: Since interme-
diate good producers are monopolists facing downward sloping demand curves, their prot
functions can be rewritten as i = Y 1 yi  (r+i)ki wni pooi; which is concave as long as
(ak + an+ ao)  1: Prot maximization by each intermediate-good-producing rm leads to
the following rst order conditions: e 1i ki = akpiyi=ei; r+ i = akpiyi=ki; w = anpiyi=ni;
and po = aopiyi=oi: In a symmetric equilibrium, we have ni = n; ki = k; ei = e; i = ;
oi = o; yi = y = Y; i = ; and pi = 1:
A representative consumer in the economy maximizes expected life-time utility,
E0
1X
t=0
t

log ct   b n
1+
t
1 + 

; (1)
subject to ct + st+1 = (1 + rt)st + wtnt + t; where s denotes aggregate savings. Since the
aggregate factor payment for oil, poo; goes to foreigners, it is not included in the consumers
income. The rst order conditions for utility maximization with respect to labor supply
and savings are given, respectively, by bnt = wt=ct and 1=ct = Et f(1 + rt+1) =ct+1g : In
equilibrium, st = kt and factor prices equal their marginal products.
By substitutions using the equilibrium factor demand functions for oil and the capacity
utilization rate, the production function can be reduced to
yt = 

1
pot
 aon
1 aon
k
akk
1 aon
t n
ann
1 aon
t ; (2)
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where  is a positive constant, n  =(   ak) > 1; and  k  (   1)=(   ak) < 1: After
rewriting the production function in this way, we can notice several things. First, the oil price
serves as an adverse productivity shock in the model (At = 1=pot ). In particular, the larger the
cost share of oil, ao, the larger the impact an oil price shock has on total factor productivity
(since aon=(1   aon) increases with ao). In addition, the cost share of oil enhances the
output elasticity of labor (since ann=(1   aon) also increases with ao). Second, capacity
utilization amplies the impact of oil shocks. Capacity utilization introduces a new term,
n = =(   ak) > 1, into the output elasticities with respect to po and n. Thus, capacity
utilization magnies the impact of an oil shock via two channels: a direct channel, via its
positive e¤ect on the output elasticity of total factor productivity, and an indirect channel,
via its positive e¤ect on the output elasticity of labor. Third, capacity utilization enhances
returns to scale if ak + an + ao > 1; because k + n  ak + an + ao; with equality only if
ak + an + ao = 1.4
The model can be solved by log-linearizing the rst order conditions around the steady
state. It is shown by Wen (1998) and Aguiar-Conraria and Wen (2004) that with very mild
externalities, this model possesses multiple dynamic equilibria around a unique steady state.
In particular, equilibrium output and the capital stock in the model follow the following
dynamic process (circumex variables denote percentage deviations from the steady state
values):

y^t
k^t

=M

y^t 1
k^t 1

+R1Et 1p^t +R2p^t 1 +

1
0

t; (3)
whereM is a full-rank matrix with both eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle on the complex
plane, and t+1 is a one-step-ahead forecasting error of output, dened as t = y^t Et 1y^t;
which satises Ett+1 = 0 for all t: The forecast error may serve as a source of sunspots
or animal spirits in this model when indeterminacy arises.5 In this paper, we assume there
are no sunspots by setting  = 0. This implies that the indeterminacy of the initial output
level, given the state fk^0; p0g, can be resolved by setting y^0 = 0.6
2.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model using the following parameter values, which are standard in the
literature for quarterly models:  = 0 (indivisible labor),  = 0:99; and  = 1:4 (implying
a steady-state rate of  = 0:025). Since the model can be mapped into a perfectly competi-
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tive model with aggregate production externalities, we calibrate the technology parameters,
f; ak; an; aog, according to an externality version of the model. Denote the externality
parameter for production by ; in a symmetric equilibrium the aggregate version of the
intermediate sectors production function can then be written as
yt = (etkt)
k(1+)n
n(1+)
t o
(1 k n)(1+)
t ; (4)
where the aggregate returns to scale are given by 1 + . This model is equivalent to the
monopolistic competition model if (1 + ) = 1; ak = k(1 + ); an = n(1 + ), and
ao = (1   k   n)(1 + ). Thus, we can calibrate the output elasticity parameters in the
production function according to each production factors cost share in output. Following
the existing literature (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer 1994 and Wen 1998), we set labors share
n = 0:7. Nordhaus (2002) estimates imported oils share in GDP for the post-war period
to be about one percent (with a standard error of 0:67 percent). Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996, p. 564-565) also suggest that imported oil accounts for about 1:6 percent of GDP.
Hence we set oils share o = 0:015 as our benchmark. This implies capitals share k =
0:285. Laitner and Stolyarov (2004) recently re-estimated the aggregate returns to scale for
the U.S. economy. Their robust estimate of returns to scale is in the range of 1:09 to 1:11.
We choose  = 0:108; which is in line with their estimates. This implies a markup of around
11 percent (1= = 1 +   1:11) in the monopolistic version of our model.
We also need to assume a stochastic process for the oil price in order to compute the
equilibrium decision rules, which are functions of the forecasts of future oil prices, Etpt+j;
for all j  0: Based on both the Dickey-Fuller test and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test,
we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root in oil prices for either the entire post-war
sample (1950:1-2003:4) or the sample period we use (1950:1-1978:4). Further econometric
analyses suggest that the oil price can be reasonably characterized as following a random
walk. The random walk assumption is also consistent with our empirical VARs in Section 3.
The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 1.
2.2 Predictions
Before presenting the predictions of our model, we rst present the predictions of standard
models so as to highlight the importance of the multiplier-accelerator mechanism missing in
standard models. The predictions of a model with constant returns to scale ( = 0), perfect
competition ( = 1), and xed capacity utilization (e = 1) are presented as Model 1 in Figure
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2 (and a close up in Figure 2-1), where the solid lines represent U.S. data and the dashed
lines represent the model. They show that the standard model cannot generate a signicant
recession after the oil shock in 1974. The recession in the model is barely observable. Output
contracts by only two percent in the model after a near doubling of the oil price in 1974,
while the actual contraction is about eight percent in the data (see Figure 2-1 for a close
up).
Allowing for capacity utilization can greatly magnify the impact of oil shocks. This can
be seen from the predictions of Finns (2000) capacity utilization model presented as Model
2 in Figure 2 and Figure 2-1 (dot-dashed lines). These gures show that Finns model is
able to match the depth of the 1975 recession in output. This is attributable to a variable
capacity utilization that amplies the impact of the oil shocks. However, the model still fails
to match the data on several grounds. First, it predicts an immediate, permanent recession
after the oil shock in 1973, failing to explain the gradualness of the recession in 1974-75
and the recovery in 1975-78. Second, the model cannot match the depth of the recession in
investment and employment, and it over-predicts the depth of the recession in consumption.
Furthermore, the model fails to predict the delay of the recession in employment by several
quarters. Among these failures, the failure to match the U-shaped transitional dynamics of
the recession is the most striking.7
Figure 3 and Figure 3-1 (a close up) show that our model improves the predictions of
the standard models substantially on several grounds. First, it can predict not only the
depth of the 1975 recession in U.S. output, but also the depth of the recession in investment
and employment. Second and most strikingly, the model is able to predict the U-shaped
transitional dynamics seen in the data. For example, the model predicts that the trough of
the recession is delayed by 4-6 quarters after the oil price increase in late 1973, and that there
will be a recovery in 1976-78. The model tends to under-predict the recession in consumption
and over-predict the recession in employment. Overall, however, the improvements of the
model over the standard models are signicant.
2.3 Dissecting the Multiplier-Accelerator E¤ect
The reason for the models success lies in a multiplier-accelerator mechanism emerging under
externalities (or monopolistic competition with increasing returns to scale). This mechanism
gives rise to dampened cycles. To understand the multiplier-accelerator mechanism, recall
that the reduced-form production function is given by Equation (2). If, on the other hand,
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we use the externality version of the model by setting ao = o(1 + ); ak = k(1 + );
an = n(1 + ); and o + k + n = 1, the reduced-form aggregate production function can
be written as
yt = 

1
pot
 o(1+)n
1 o(1+))n
k
k(1+)k
1 o(1+)n
t n
n(1+)n
1 o(1+)n
t ; (5)
where n  = [   k(1 + )] ;  k  (   1)= [   k(1 + )] :
Suppose there are no externalities ( = 0) and there is no variable capacity utilization
( =1 and n =  k = 1). Then the output elasticity of the oil price is given by o=(1 o);
and the output elasticity of labor is given by n=(1  o). Based on our calibration of oils
share in production, the oil elasticity is 0:015 and the labor elasticity is 0: 71, suggesting that
a doubling of the oil price (a 100% increase) translates to less than a 1:5% change in output,
holding labor constant. Since a higher oil price decreases labors productivity, employment
will also decrease, amplifying the impact of oil price on output. For simplicity, assume that
labor decreases by 1%. Then there will be an additional 0:71% change in output. The total
output change is thus about 2:2%.
If capacity utilization is variable, then the oil price elasticity is given by  on=(1  
on) =  0:019, and the e¤ective labor elasticity is given by nn(1   on) = 0: 9. A
doubling of the oil price can then lead to about a 3% decrease in output under the maintained
assumption that labor decreases by just 1%. Thus the multiplier e¤ect of capacity utilization
is approximately 1:3. This multiplier e¤ect, however, is too small to account for the data.8
If we allow for externalities or increasing returns to scale in the capacity utilization
model, although the size of the contemporaneous (or instantaneous) multiplier does not
change dramatically for small externalities, an accelerator will emerge, giving rise to an
intertemporal (or dynamic) multiplier. Under the intertemporal multiplier, output not only
decreases in the impact period but also continues to decrease over time, leading to a deeper
slump. For example, if  = 0:1, the output elasticity of the oil price becomes 0:02 and the
labors elasticity becomes approximately 1:0. Hence, judged by the instantaneous multiplier,
the total change in output is still roughly 3% in the impact period. But, under the inuence of
the intertemporal multiplier (i.e., the accelerator), output continues to decrease for several
quarters before a trough is reached. Based on our parameter calibration, at the trough,
output is about 8% below its initial value.
The cyclical propagation mechanism (or intertemporal multiplier) arises under exter-
nalities because rmsproduction decisions and investment activities reinforce each other,
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causing the aggregate economy to over-shoot the steady state as the economy converges.
Such over-shooting behavior implies cycles. Consider a permanent increase in the oil price.
The rise in the oil price increases the marginal cost of production at the rm level, hence re-
ducing oil demand as well as employment and capacity utilization. This causes a contraction
in output. Anticipating a lower future productivity of capital, rms also reduce investment
spending, depressing aggregate demand and leading to a fall in the capital stock. Due to
the force of externalities among rms, this becomes a cumulative process of contractions. As
the contraction continues, the rising marginal product of capital dictates that the decrease
in output slow down (de-accelerate). The result is that sooner or later the capital stock and
output must stop declining, and capacity utilization and investment must start to increase to
exploit the excessively high marginal product of capital at a business-cycle trough. But then
a rise in investment demand also triggers output expansion. Thus, the above propagation
mechanism reverses itself, leading to a cumulative process of recovery and expansion.
3 Empirical Evidence
Although the model predicts that oil prices alone can explain the movements of the U.S.
economy after the oil shocks in 1973-74, there is no prior reason to believe that this is indeed
the case for the U.S. economy. It is, for example, entirely possible that non-oil shocks, such
as monetary shocks, also contributed to the business cycle following the oil price increases
in the early 70s. If this is the case, then being able to fully account for the deep recession
by oil shocks alone may not be a good property for the model to have. Hence, empirically
estimating the e¤ects of the oil shocks in the early 70s on the U.S. economy can provide
evidence to support (or reject) the model. Unfortunately, it is in general very di¢ cult to
identify the exact e¤ect of oil shocks and non-oil shocks quantitatively in empirical studies
because any such attempt via structural VARs inevitably involves identifying assumptions
that are theory-loaded and hence may not necessarily be true. Therefore, the evidence
provided in this section can only be viewed as circumstantial, and it serves only as a reference
point for our theoretical analysis. More empirical studies are needed to further validate and
reconrm our ndings. We focus our attention rst on the e¤ects of the OPEC oil embargo
in 1973.
To study the e¤ects of exogenous oil shocks on the U.S. economy, we rst decompose
movements in the price of imported oil into those driven by non-domestic (or exogenous)
factors and those driven by domestic (or endogenous) factors. Econometric tests show that
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post-war oil prices, especially prior to the mid-80s, can be best described as random walks.
Hence, our methodology for identifying the exogenous factors is based on a long-run restric-
tion on the e¤ect of an oil shock (e.g., the OPEC decision to raise the oil price) on the
nominal oil price, following the econometric methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989).
We assume that an exogenous oil shock (such as the OPEC embargo) is an innovation that
can have a permanent e¤ect on the oil price, and that other factors, which may potentially
have an impact on oil prices through demand-side e¤ects, can only have transitory e¤ects on
the oil price. Based on this identifying assumption, our empirical result attributes more than
95% of the movements in the oil price to the exogenous oil shocks. This is consistent with
a large body of empirical literature that has convincingly argued that post-war movements
in oil prices (at least up to the mid-1980s) were largely exogenous to U.S. economic activ-
ity (see, e.g., Hamilton 1983 and the literature cited in the Introduction). Our identifying
assumption is hence reasonable for the period we study.
Based on this identication assumption, we can also decompose movements in the U.S.
economy into those driven by oil shocks and those driven by non-oil shocks. In order to best
capture the e¤ect of non-oil shocks on the U.S. economy, we have included several variables
in our VAR: GDP, consumption, investment, and employment. Our results are robust when
monetary policy variables, such as the interest rate and money supply, are included in the
VAR. We do not impose prior restrictions on the impact of oil shocks on the other variables
in the VAR, such as the output level. Instead, we allow the data to tell us how those U.S.
variables respond to the oil shocks so identied.
The data used in our analysis are seasonally adjusted quarterly data starting in 1950:1
and ending in 1978:4, right before the second major oil shock hit the economy in 1979
(which is also a time when the economy had completely recovered to its pre-1973 shock level
relative to the trend). The oil price data we use is the spot oil price of the West Texas
Intermediate (available from the St. Louis Feds website). The other data used are real
GDP, real consumption for non-durables plus services, real xed investment, and total non-
farm employment (available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics). All variables used in the VARs are logged and rst-di¤erenced. In other words,
the growth rates are used in the VARs. A constant and 4 lags for each variable are included
in the VAR estimation. Since we are only interested in the joint e¤ects of the non-oil shocks
(namely, we are not interested in further distinguishing the non-oil shocks from each other),
how these non-oil shocks are individually identied does not matter. What matters are the
identications imposed on the non-oil shocks as a group. We therefore apply the Choleski
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triangularization to a long-run matrix to identify the sum of the non-oil shocks. To uncover
the log levels of the time series, we integrate the growth rate series by adding a constant to
each variable (based on the mean growth rates of the data) to induce a linear growth trend.9
The empirical results are reported in two gures. First, the identied e¤ects of the non-
oil shocks on output, consumption, investment, and employment are reported in Figure 4.
We see that uctuations driven by non-oil shocks track the actual movements in output,
consumption, investment, and employment very well before the oil crisis (between 1950 and
the early 1970s), suggesting that the oil shocks are not the main source of the business
cycle for the entire period prior to 1973.10 In other words, non-oil shocks have been mainly
responsible for all of the business cycles in the U.S. from 1950 until 1973. Starting from 1974,
however, the picture changes dramatically. Non-oil shocks are no longer able to explain the
movements in output, consumption, investment and employment. This stunning fact can
also be seen in Figure 5, which shows the sole e¤ects of the oil shocks on the U.S. economy.
There we see that, in complement to Figure 4, oil shocks have contributed very little to
output uctuations in the entire sample period prior to the recession 1974-75. Starting in
1974, however, oil shocks become the dominating force in movements of output, consumption,
investment, and employment. These results are consistent with the predictions of our model
using the actual oil price as the forcing variable.
Robustness: The models predictions in the previous section and the VAR analysis in the
current section are based on the nominal oil price. We have also simulated our model and
estimated the VAR using the real oil price, dened as the ratio of the nominal oil price to the
GDP deator. The results are almost exactly the same as those obtained under the nominal
oil price for both the theoretical model and the empirical VAR.11 In addition, we have also
tried to follow the idea of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) by identifying the component in
the real oil price that is due to oil shocks in the nominal oil price. Then the movements in
the real oil price due to the oil shocks are fed into our theoretical model. The predictions
remain essentially the same.
We have also conducted robustness analysis on the identifying restrictions and the spec-
ications used in the VARs. Bernanke et al. (1997) and especially Barsky and Kilian (2001)
argue that monetary policy, instead of oil shocks, could have been responsible for the reces-
sion in 1975. Hence we have also re-estimated our measure of oil shocks and their impact
on the U.S. economy by extending our VAR to include some measures of monetary policy
(e.g., the growth rate of the money supply and the interest rate). Our empirical estimates of
the impact of the oil shocks on the U.S. economy between 1950 and 1978 remain essentially
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unchanged when these measures of monetary policy are included in the VAR. Furthermore,
very similar results are obtained if short-run identifying restrictions, instead of the long-run
identifying restriction, are adopted for identifying the e¤ect of oil shocks in the VARs. To
preserve space, details of these results are not reported in the paper, but they are available
upon request.
4 The Second Oil Price Shock: 1979-1980
In this section we extend our analysis beyond 1978 to 1984, studying the e¤ects of the oil
crisis in 1979-80.12 The predictions of our model for the e¤ect of the second oil shock are
presented in Figure 6 (top panel) where the investment series is selected as the focus. It
shows that, although the model makes the correct prediction about the recession that follows
the shock in 1979-80, it misses the temporary boom of the U.S. economy in 1981. Because
of this, the model predicts a deep recession in 1981, but a deep recession in the actual
economy did not arrive until late 1982. Similarly, the model predicts a strong recovery in
late 1981 and beyond, about 5-6 quarters earlier than the actual recovery in and after 1983.
The magnitude of the deep recession in late 1982, however, is well captured by the model,
although the predicted one is about 5-6 quarters too early.
Therefore, according to our model, there must have been some non-oil shocks hitting the
economy in 1981 that explain the sudden boom in 1981 and the consequent delays in the
deep recession and the big recovery. The implication that some non-oil shocks may have been
active during this period is conrmed by our VAR analysis in Figure 6 (bottom panel).13
The solid line in that gure represents the predicted e¤ects of oil shocks identied in the
VAR. It shows that in sharp contrast to the 1975 recession, oil shocks in 1979-80 cannot
explain the sudden boom in 1981 and the postponed recession in late 1982. Instead, oil
shocks predict a deep recession in 1981 and a strong recovery in 1982 and beyond, similar to
the predictions of our general equilibrium model. Thus, our model still accords reasonably
well with the experience of the early 80s.
Interestingly, such results, based on both the theoretical model and the empirical VARs,
are remarkably consistent with the empirical ndings of Hooker (1996). Based on an ex-
tensive empirical analysis that is independent and signicantly di¤erent from ours, Hooker
concludes that "historical decompositions indicate that the oil price shock of 1973 had a
large and well-measured impact on the macroeconomy, while that of 1979 was signicant
but incomplete in capturing the dynamics of the 1980-82 recession" (Hooker 1996, p.211).
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5 Concluding Remarks
Standard models are not able to quantitatively account for the deep recession in the mid-70s
when the actual oil price series is used for model simulations, despite the common belief
that oil shocks in the 1970s are responsible for that recession. In this paper, we provide
support for the importance of oil shocks in driving U.S. economic uctuations in the 1970s.
Our results strengthen the ndings of a large body of empirical literature that suggests that
the oil crisis in the early 1970s is responsible for the deep recession in 1975. We argue that
the failure of standard models hinges on a missing multiplier-accelerator mechanism that
serves to amplify and propagate the impact of oil shocks throughout the U.S. economy. We
construct such a multiplier-accelerator mechanism in a general equilibrium model and show
that the mechanism is capable of explaining the important features of the data.
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Notes
1This is especially true before the mid-1980s. See, for example, Rasche and Tatom (1981),
Hamilton (1983, 1985, 1996, 2003), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Santini (1985), Gisser
and Goodwin (1986), Loungani (1986), Tatom (1988), Mork (1989), Hamilton and Herrera
(2004), and many others. Also see the references in Rotemberg and Woodford (1996).
2Empirical tests show that post-war oil prices follow a random walk. This is especially
true prior to the early 1980s. This suggests that oil price changes are permanent for the
period we study.
3In a similar spirit, Bernanke et al. (1997) blame contractionary monetary policy con-
ducted in 1974 for the deep recession in 1974-75. But see the skepticism raised against the
monetary view by Blanchard (2001) and Blinder (2001). Leduc and Sill (2004) study the
likely e¤ects of monetary policy during that period using a calibrated model. However, their
analysis falls short in addressing our questions because they do not use the historical time
series of monetary shocks or oil shocks to reproduce the recession in the mid-1970s.
4Finns (2000) model of capacity utilization is slightly di¤erent from this one, but the
mechanisms are similar.
5See Cass and Shell (1983) for the early literature on sunspot-driven uctuations.
6See Farmer (1999) and Benhabib and Wen (2004) for discussion on calibrating indeter-
minate models. Our results are robust to other choices of the initial value of output. For
example, we can also assume that investment or employment has inertia so that {^0 = 0 or
n^0 = 0, and the results do not change signicantly.
7Finn (2000) shows that her model and the model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)
give almost identical predictions.
8The reason that Finns (2000) model has a large enough multiplier to match the depth
of the recession is that she assumes a much larger oil share in the US aggregate production.
Her calibration is equivalent to setting o = 0:043; implying an output elasticity of the oil
price in the order of on=(1   on)  6%: This elasticity, combined with a fall in labor,
can account for the fall in output.
9Recall that the linear growth trends were removed during the VAR estimation since a
constant is included in the VAR.
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10This does not imply that the oil shocks are not related to recessions prior to 1973. The
gure simply indicates that at a quantitative level, oil shocks on their own did not play a
crucial role in U.S. economic activity prior to 1973.
11This is so because real oil prices move very closely with nominal oil prices in that period.
12We do not go beyond 1984 in our analysis because there is evidence of a structural change
in the relation between oil and the rest of the economy in the mid-80s. In particular, after
the mid-80s negative oil price shocks become frequent and tend not to have much e¤ect on
the economy due to the well-known asymmetry of oil shocks discussed by Hamilton (2003)
and Mork (1989). Our model, like the model of Finn and that of Rotemberg and Woodford,
implies a symmetric e¤ect of oil shocks and is hence not suitable for analyzing the e¤ects of
oil shocks after the mid-80s.
13This is the VAR used earlier with the sample period extended to 1984.
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Figure 1. Oil Price and Economic Activity.
Figure 2. Predictions of a Standard RBC Model (1) and Finns Model (2).
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Figure 2-1. (A close up of Figure 2).
Figure 3. Predictions of Our Model.
22
Figure 3-1. (A close up of Figure 3).
Figure 4. E¤ects of Non-Oil Shocks on the U.S. Economy (solid lines).
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Figure 5. E¤ects of Oil Shocks on the U.S. Economy (solid lines).
Figure 6. Predictions for the Second Oil Shock (solid lines).
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Table 1. Parameter Values
 = 0 indivisible labor
 = 0:99 discount factor
 = 1:4 ) steady-state capital depreciation of 2:5%
n = 0:7 labors share
o = 0:015 oils share
k = 1  n   o capitals share
1 +  = 1:108 returns to scale
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